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WITH DISABILITIES ACT
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Richard H. McAdams.  Cambridge and London: Harvard University
Press. 2015. P. 261. $39.95.
Introduction
The question of why people follow the law has long been a subject of
scholarly consideration.1 Prevailing accounts of how law changes behavior
coalesce around two major themes: legitimacy and deterrence. Advocates of
legitimacy argue that law is obeyed when it is created through a legitimate
process and its substance comports with community mores.2 Others empha-
size deterrence, particularly those who subscribe to law-and-economics the-
ories. These scholars argue that law makes certain socially undesirable
behaviors more costly, and thus individuals are less likely to undertake
them.3
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1. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton Univ. Press 2006)
(1990); Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2 Law & Pol’y Q. 61
(1980); Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 41 (2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
453, 468–77 (1997); cf. John M. Darley, Citizens’ Sense of Justice and the Legal System, 10
Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 10 (2001) (“[C]ontradictions between criminal codes
and the moral views of the community put people’s respect for the legal system at risk.”).
2. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1399, 1402, 1404–10 (2005)
(presenting evidence that citizens are less likely to consider the law a moral authority when
they perceive a disconnect with community norms); William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes,
86 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1871 (2000) (noting that individuals’ law-abiding behavior is typically
influenced more by social norms than by black letter law).
3. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Deterrence (Empirical), Economic Analy-
ses of, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 461 (Steven N. Durlauf & Law-
rence E. Blume eds., 2d. ed. 2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id
=pde2008_E000226 [http://perma.cc/G6DL-NLZE]; Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We
Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 765 (2010); Mats Per-
sson & Claes-Henric Siven, Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of
Crime, 59 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 214 (2006).
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More recently, legal scholars have recognized expressive effects as a third
mechanism by which law influences behavior.4 Expressive law scholars often
focus on law’s ability to change the social meaning of particular behaviors.5
A common example is smoking laws, which likely contributed to changing
the social understanding of smoking from a desirable “cool” activity to one
that is dirty and undesirable.6 This changed understanding in turn affects
behavior by increasing the likelihood that individuals will socially sanction
those who violate no-smoking laws. In addition, some will internalize the
law’s message by changing their own preferences regarding smoking. While
smoking laws are a paradigmatic example, an expressive mechanism has ex-
plained a wide variety of laws.7
Being relatively new as a field, the expressive effect of law is the least
studied and understood among theories on how law affects behavior. It is
likewise heavily discounted.8 As Richard McAdams9 notes in his important
new book The Expressive Powers of Law (Expressive Powers), empirical schol-
arship portrays analyses of legal compliance as “a long-running conflict be-
tween the social sciences, a battle between the rival hypotheses of deterrence
and legitimacy” and in doing so “diverts our attention away from the possi-
bility of other explanations” (p. 4). Thus the entrenched debate between
deterrence and legitimacy partly obscures expressive effects from
consideration.
4. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1
(2003); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339
(2000) [hereinafter Attitudinal Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expres-
sive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2000) [hereinafter Focal Point].
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Eco-
nomics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive
Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 35 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deter-
rence, 83 Va. L. Rev 349 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 943, 968–72 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2021 (1996).
6. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2022, 2035–36, 2050–52.
7. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 5, at 595 (finding a high level of compliance with
“pooper-scooper” laws and airport smoking laws, even though enforcement of either is rare);
Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 577,
577–81, 608–12 (2006) (examining the effects of file-sharing laws on social norms between
students); Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 845, 860–70 (2009) (finding antidiscrimination
laws to generate unexpected social costs unrelated to those laws’ protections and regulations);
Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with
Symbolic Fines, 9 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 135, 137–39 (2007) (finding voting to decline in Swiss
Cantons after the repeal of mandatory voting laws that carried nominal fines); Maggie Wittlin,
Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive Effects of Law, 28 Yale J. Reg. 419,
419–23, 456–59 (2011) (“[A] highly publicized seatbelt law in one state can affect seatbelt use
in other states.”).
8. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law 40 (2015) (explaining that nonco-
ercive law hardly deserves exclusive or dominant attention).
9. Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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Another potential reason for the marginalization of expressive mecha-
nisms from law and economics is concerns about the complexity of expres-
sive mechanisms, which some argue negatively affects their ability to be used
predictively.10 Expressive effects occur through a variety of incompletely un-
derstood cognitive and social mechanisms.11 Hence, determining the expres-
sive influence of law requires a sophisticated understanding of complex
social and cognitive processes that are not yet fully grasped. Adding further
complexity to expressive analysis, scholars also recognize that law is just one
of many different influences on social meaning and individual belief.12 A
proper understanding of expressive effects therefore also requires separating
the influence of law from other potential behavioral influences such as relig-
ion or social movements.
McAdams steps into this academic fray and sets an ambitious agenda
with his newest book, Expressive Powers. He aspires to a detailed, rational
choice-based model of expressive effects, and likewise seeks to demonstrate
the relative importance of expressive effects to our understanding of how law
affects behavior.13 Expressive Powers is thus both an exegesis and an attempt
to thrust expressive theory into the mainstream discussion of why individu-
als obey the law. McAdams succeeds laudably on both accounts. First he
provides a detailed, analytically rigorous framework, and then he explains
how to apply that framework to a wide range of laws from traffic regulation
to international law. Such a far-reaching account of expressive effects chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom on why citizens obey the law and lays the
course for richer future research.
Any effort to develop a theory in an area of great complexity, however,
is likely to raise particular concerns about the theory. In the case of Expres-
sive Law, these concerns include lack of comprehensiveness and lack of pre-
dictability. No theory is likely to capture every aspect of the complex
interaction of the numerous and varied forces responsible for law’s expres-
sive influence on behavior. Further, the same complexity raises trepidation
that expressive analysis does not yield predictive results and thus is of limited
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 1603, 1604 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1436, 1438–45 (2005) (constitutional law and culture
are mutually reinforcing and “non-judicial actors” often influence the direction of law);
Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 791,
794–802 (2002) (discussing the relationship between the women’s movement and the law);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 419, 420–21 (2001) (finding that “social movements literature does not adequately
reflect the importance of law”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297 (2001) (discussing the feminist
movement’s effect on equal protection jurisprudence).
13. See pp. 6–8. McAdams does not claim that expressive effects are more powerful than
legitimacy or deterrence: “I hope to demonstrate that, in some contexts, an alternative, expres-
sive mechanism plausibly causes more of the compliance we observe than deterrence or legiti-
macy.” P. 4.
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utility to lawyers. These two concerns are often interrelated. The need for
predictability requires structure and simplification which, of course, threat-
ens comprehensive analysis of complex behavioral mechanisms. While few
theories are utterly comprehensive, a key goal for success of expressive analy-
sis is to be as comprehensive as possible without sacrificing analytical rigor
or predictable application.
In this Review, we address both issues of comprehensiveness and pre-
dictability. We turn first to the criticism that behavioral theories cannot be
used predictively. This critique is founded on the notion of an unavoidable
trade-off between complexity and predictive ability. We argue that, even if
increasing complexity decreases predictability, that result does not militate
in favor of more parsimonious theories. Theories such as deterrence can
become so Spartan that they too, by blinding themselves to other causal
mechanisms, cannot predict law’s effect on behavior. We find McAdams’s
claim that expressive effects are relatively ubiquitous convincing. The ubiq-
uity of expressive influence—as well as myriad other influences on behavior
described in the social sciences—seriously undercuts the core critique be-
cause parsimonious theories will ignore these other behavioral effects al-
though they occur often.
We then turn to concerns regarding comprehensiveness. Complexity, of
course, makes it difficult to develop a comprehensive theory, especially when
analytical rigor and predictability are also necessary. McAdams’s theory is
certainly robust enough to provide predictive results in many cases, yet it
does not claim to be comprehensive. Indeed, McAdams is very attentive to
the limits of his theory and explains that the book is intended solely to
provide a starting point for empirical analysis of expressive mechanisms.14
Nonetheless, Expressive Powers provides a solid foundation from which fur-
ther exploration and application of expressive theories can progress. We ex-
pect that the book, as the first synthesis and thorough exegesis of expressive
mechanisms, will become the starting point for many scholars wishing to
consider the expressive effects of law. In the spirit of using Expressive Powers
as the springboard McAdams intended it to be, this Review considers two
limitations on McAdams’s theory and argues that these limitations can be
overcome—increasing comprehensiveness without sacrificing the clarity that
comes from analytical rigor.
We raise our suggestions for extension of McAdams’s theory through an
analysis of the expressive influences of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).15 The ADA, which passed twenty-five years ago, prohibits discrimi-
nation against people with disabilities across many sectors, prominently in
employment and places of public accommodation.16 In analyzing the ADA’s
14. See pp. 4–7.
15. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
16. For an overview of the ADA by one of its designers, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413 (1991).
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expressive effects we offer two specific suggestions for extension of McAd-
ams’s theory. First we aver that a model of inferential reasoning—which the
book relies on frequently but never adopts explicitly—should be used to
ensure that all types of information provided by law can be considered in
expressive analysis. McAdams considers only how law provides information
on the attitudes of others, risks of the regulated activity, and compliance
with the law, but law can provide information on myriad factors. Second, we
maintain that an additional inferential test regarding the expressive effects of
compliance with a law should also be developed.
The Review is organized as follows. Part I describes McAdams’s theory
and its application to a wide variety of laws. Part II considers the assertions
made by skeptics that the incomplete nature of behavioral theories makes
the predictive use of such theories more difficult, and argues that continued
disregard of behavioralism makes parsimonious theories less predictive as
well. In Part III, we use the ADA to demonstrate the importance of expres-
sive analysis while also identifying ways to expand McAdams’s theory, espe-
cially in relation to providing information.
I. McAdams and Expressive Powers
Before discussing McAdams’s theory, it is necessary to define what we
mean by expressive effects because the concept is subject to different de-
scriptions. Many law-and-economics scholars are particularly interested in
the relationship between legal rules, community norms, and the “social
meaning” of particular behaviors. Generally, these commentators suggest
that law acts expressively when it changes the likelihood of social sanctioning
or changes internal beliefs so that one feels guilty for doing something that
she used to do without guilt.17 For example, Professor Lessig describes how
dueling laws changed the social meaning of dueling by providing a compet-
ing way in which community members could understand the subject.18 Prior
to the law’s passage, refusing a duel was considered dishonorable. Passage of
a law against dueling, Lessig argues, changed the social meaning of declining
to duel from a dishonorable action to an honorable undertaking of legal
duty.19 Other academics have likewise considered the way in which law influ-
ences social norms and thus takes advantage of social-sanctioning mecha-
nisms as a means of enforcement.20 Finally, scholars have specifically
considered ways in which individuals can internalize a law’s message,
17. See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 5, at 65–72; Lessig, supra note 5, at 964–73; Attitudinal
Theory, supra note 4, at 341–49; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regula-
tion of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 340, 397–99 (1997) (Norms are “informal social regulari-
ties that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of
a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both”).
18. Lessig, supra note 5, at 968–72.
19. Id.
20. See Geisinger, supra note 5, at 63–70; Attitudinal Theory, supra note 4, at 364–72.
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thereby changing their beliefs and in turn their preferred behaviors.21 Sanc-
tioning in this case is accomplished by feelings of guilt that arise if one fails
to do what she believes to be the correct action.22
In Expressive Powers, McAdams argues that expressive impacts can arise
from two distinct mechanisms. McAdams describes the first mechanism as
law’s coordinating function (p. 5). Pursuant to this mechanism, the law
serves as a focal point around which individuals can coordinate their own
behavior. The other way by which law works expressively is through provid-
ing information (p. 6). As McAdams notes, passage of a law carries with it
information that enables individuals to update their own beliefs about the
regulated behavior: “law provides information; information changes beliefs;
new beliefs change behavior” (p. 136; emphasis omitted). While McAdams
provides many examples of how these two different mechanisms influence
behavior, he begins his discussion by explaining the novel theory of focal
points.
Perhaps because of concerns regarding the complexity of human behav-
ior, McAdams identifies the way in which law works as a focal point with
painstaking detail. Indeed, Expressive Powers is at its best in these chapters as
it lays out a clear, deep, and far-reaching explanation of focal points and
describes the differences between focal-point effects, legitimacy, and deter-
rence. To start, McAdams turns to the groundbreaking work of Thomas
Schelling to identify a number of different games that require coordination
(rather than cooperation) among rationally self-interested individuals and to
explain how focal points solve these problems.23
Consider one of many examples throughout the book that lucidly ap-
plies the theory of focal points: traffic control. McAdams explains that much
driver interaction can be described as a hawk/dove game:
Traffic involves a constant stream of priority “disputes” between drivers,
pedestrians, and bicyclists. For example, two drivers on intersecting streets
seek to make turns that cut across the path of the other. Drivers on merg-
ing roads or lanes each seeks [sic] to get ahead of the other or those travel-
ing in opposite directions . . . . These countless priority disputes are
prototypical coordination problems. They have the structure of a [hawk/
dove] game because each driver wants to proceed ahead of the other . . .
but there is a common interest in coordinating to avoid the worst out-
come—a collision . . . . (pp. 76–77)
21. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 1, at 474 (noting that our society sets norms
based on criminal law); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 515, 517–21 (2004)
(“[I]nformation, alone or in combination with other regulatory instruments, may have sub-
stantial effects on individual behavior.”).
22. See Geisinger, supra note 5, at 63, 65–73 (“[O]ften times law is enforced through
social sanction or internalized guilt.”); McAdams, supra note 17, at 377–80.
23. P. 23. This is in response to the vast majority of scholarship in the field focusing on
information provision, in consequence of which coordination problems (unlike cooperation
problems such as the prisoner’s dilemma) are substantially overlooked in the legal literature.
Pp. 22–23.
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The law controls behavior in these circumstances not just through legiti-
macy or deterrence. Instead, while people may follow the rules in such situa-
tions partly because the law is legitimate or creates a fine for its violation, a
major reason people follow the rules is because they don’t want to get into
an accident. This is law’s coordinating function: it “expresses” a focal point
around which people can coordinate their behavior.
Of course, law is only one means of providing a focal point for coordi-
nation. To use an example from Schelling, when a traffic light fails, individu-
als may direct traffic at an intersection, enabling drivers to coordinate their
behavior (p. 23). This raises a secondary question of “when is law likely to
serve as a focal point?” McAdams answers by identifying four general condi-
tions for focal effect:
(1) The situation the law addresses includes an element of coordination—
the most important limit . . . ; (2) the law is sufficiently clear; (3) the law is
sufficiently public; and (4) there are no stronger, competing focal points.
(p. 62)
Even with these important limitations, McAdams avers that the focal-
point effect of law is broad, and that his assertions regarding “coordinating
on places, times, communication, and games is true about a great many
parts of life” (p. 29). The next two chapters of Expressive Powers are dedi-
cated to this claim and seek to illustrate that “life is permeated by the need
for coordination by convention, including the situations of social conflict
that law addresses” (p. 29). Accordingly, McAdams demonstrates ways in
which law works to coordinate behavior in situations as diverse as traffic
regulation (pp. 76–82) and property disputes (p. 88), and ranging as far as
international law (p. 91).
McAdams’s comprehensive treatment of coordination adds substantially
to the behavioral legal compliance field because to date expressive law schol-
ars have given little attention to the coordinating function of law. Rather, the
vast majority of expressive law scholarship has focused on the second com-
ponent of Expressive Power’s theory—providing information.24 As a general
matter, McAdams’s thoughts on how law provides information are in keep-
ing with the existing literature. His most significant contribution is thus not
to describe a new way in which the law provides information, but to offer a
more refined and complete view of how law informs individual belief. Mc-
Adams refines this theory along a number of dimensions. He posits that law
primarily25 provides information on three different things: others’ attitudes
toward the regulated behavior (pp. 137, 139–52), the risks of the regulated
24. Pp. 6, 136–260. We elaborate on the information provision mechanism infra Parts II
and III. Hence we describe the framework only generally right now while endeavoring to show
how Expressive Powers both comports with and diverges from the existing literature.
25. McAdams does recognize that law can signal information on things other than atti-
tudes, risk, and compliance. Nonetheless, he limits his exegesis to these three mechanisms due
to his belief that these are the types of information most often signaled by law. P. 137.
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behavior (pp. 153–62), or how often the law is violated.26 McAdams then
applies this basic model to explain how different forms of lawmaking—leg-
islation (pp. 136–38), executive orders (pp. 170–73), judicial decisions (pp.
170–73), or even arbitration (pp. 199–232)—can provide that information.
He also recognizes that law enforcement, and particularly criminal law en-
forcement, can also signal information (pp. 173–79). The framework in Ex-
pressive Powers thereby synthesizes a disparate literature while also providing
a level of granularity that should serve as a springboard for scholars to more
deeply explore the expressive analysis of law in the future.
For an example of McAdams’s theory regarding the three types of infor-
mation law provides, consider the passage of a law requiring the use of car
seats. Because law is somewhat majoritarian,27 its passage may signal to some
individuals that others in the community prefer the use of car seats. Simi-
larly, the law may influence individuals to change their estimates of the risk
of not using a car seat for their children. If, after a number of years, legisla-
tors increase the penalties for violating the car-seat rule, individuals may
once more update their beliefs regarding the number of people who don’t
comply with the rule.
One aspect of the information-providing effect of law that we believe
requires a bit more clarity is McAdams’s focus on how law primarily pro-
vides information on attitudes, risk, or violations. Expressive Power relies on
the mechanism of inferential reasoning to describe how law expresses infor-
mation (pp. 144–47, 154–56), yet it doesn’t present a general model of how
law affects belief inferentially. Instead McAdams provides a detailed analysis
of how law informs individuals’ understanding of three particular things—
the attitudes of others, the risk of a particular behavior, and compliance
with the law. Failure to provide a more complete picture of the information-
provision mechanism, we believe, will unnecessarily limit expressive analysis
to consideration of just attitudes, risk, or violations when law provides in-
formation on a wide variety of other things.
II. Predictability Versus Comprehensiveness
Despite some additional minor areas where more explanation may be
needed,28 Expressive Powers succeeds in its ambition to provide a detailed,
rational choice-based model of expressive effects, and to demonstrate the
importance of expressive effects to our understanding of how law works.
Ultimately, the book leaves little doubt that expressive influences should be
considered in any comprehensive analysis of how law influences behavior.
26. Pp. 162–65. McAdams defines the three different types of information provision as
attitudinal signals, risk signals, and violation (compliance) signals. Pp. 137–38.
27. McAdams similarly spends significant effort explaining the influence of public choice
theory on the belief that law reflects the preferences of the majority. Pp. 144–47.
28. This critique of Expressive Powers ought not to be overstated. We may quibble with
some of McAdams’s theories but these are minor concerns that do not distract attention from
what we would describe as the most rigorous analysis of law’s information provision function
in the legal literature.
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Nonetheless, a further obstacle to full acceptance of expressive theory that
McAdams does not take into account needs to be addressed. Many scholars,
and particularly those law-and-economics commentators wed to rational
choice theory, criticize what they call “behaviorally thick” theories of law
specifically because the theories’ complexity undermines their predictive
ability.29 One scholar notes the mechanism by which this occurs:
[W]hen one makes one’s model more realistic by introducing more com-
plex premises, one also thereby increases—sometimes dramatically—the
problems involved in applying it . . . . The conclusions reached as the model
is made more complex become less robust—more sensitive to small varia-
tions in the initial parameters—and greater and greater precision in the
data inputs is needed to avoid reaching indeterminate conclusions. The
result is often an elegant and complex but relatively useless model that can-
not produce determinate results unless one has recourse to an often unavail-
able comprehensive and precise data set.30
These scholars assume that there must necessarily be a trade-off between
complexity and predictability. In other words, when a theory becomes more
complex it also becomes less predictive.31 These scholars prefer parsimoni-
ous theories because they can be applied predictively.32
This criticism, however, itself frames the issue incompletely because
there is also a trade-off between parsimony and predictability. Indeed, if
29. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Law and Theories, in Neorealism and Its Critics 27, 34
(Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1558–59, 1567 (1998); Scott, supra note 11, at 1607–08.
30. Gregory S. Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to Expand Its Curriculum?, 22 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 149, 154 (1997) (emphases added); see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal
Incompetence, 91 Geo. L.J. 67, 121 (2002).
31. Some behavioral law-and-economics scholars explicitly reject this. See Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U L. Rev. 632 (1999); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1475 (“Just as people often have imperfect information, which has
predictable consequences for behavior, the departures from the standard conception of the
economic agent also alter behavior in predictable ways.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Eco-
nomics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1069–74 (2000) (noting that advocates of “thick” conceptions
of rational choice theory defend these theories on grounds that they account for the multiple
factors that influence actors’ behavior); Mitchell, supra note 30, at 122 (“If the rationality of
behavior depends on the particular characteristics of the legal actor or on even just a few
characteristics of the situation at hand, then the development of behavioral models that are
both realistic and predictive becomes enormously complex.”).
32. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1201 (2001) (“We should, as a
general rule, prefer more parsimonious explanations to less parsimonious ones . . . .”); Scott,
supra note 11, at 1607–08; W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of
Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 Ind. L.J. 1, 5 (2002).
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predictability is the desired goal, as many law-and-economics scholars sug-
gest,33 parsimonious theories could be just as nonpredictive as complex the-
ories. For example, if the effect of a law will occur primarily through an
expressive or other behavioral mechanism and not because of its cost-signal,
use of a model that focuses solely on costs will be ineffective at predicting
the outcome of a rule’s passage. Indeed, the more Spartan a theory, the
greater this risk. Such is the case with the extremely parsimonious view that
law works simply as an external cost to preference satisfaction. As a theory it
may be simple, but it blinds itself to other ways in which law influences
behavior.
To illustrate, consider one of McAdams’s examples of the limited ex-
planatory power of deterrence from Expressive Powers. McAdams describes
the case of six day-care centers that imposed a fine on parents who picked
up their children late (pp. 164–65). Considering this additional external cost
to preference satisfaction, one would expect fewer late pickups. The exact
opposite happened, however, because the fee had an unexpected expressive
effect—it signaled that more parents were picking their children up late than
previously expected (pp. 164–65). Violations signaling, in turn, made the
“informal sanctions for the violation decline” (p. 165). Information that
others too are violating the rule makes late pickups less likely to receive
social sanctions (p. 165). This decrease in informal sanctions offset any ben-
efit from formal, financial sanctions. In other words, it was the “behavioral”
mechanism that most influenced behavior. If, as McAdams suggests, expres-
sive effects are ubiquitous, it becomes more difficult to argue that parsimo-
nious theories based in rational choice are more predictive as social scientists
identify new ways in which behavior can be influenced by law.
The complexity critique also sidesteps the fact that rational choice may
not actually be as parsimonious as the critics suggest. McAdams’s theory, for
example, is based purely on rational choice assumptions. Ironically, the ma-
jority of legal scholarship on expressive effects and social norms is derived
from rational choice schemas,34 and in particular game theory.35 The ques-
tion therefore arises as to why the parsimonious vision that law is simply a
cost on preference satisfaction should be privileged over thicker theories that
are based in rational choice. As discussed above, doing so simply because of
an assertion that more complex theories are less predictive ignores that a
negative correlation between parsimony and prediction can also exist.
33. See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive
Economics 3 (1984) (endorsing unrealistic assumptions in hypothesis formation and
prediction).
34. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000); McAdams, supra note 17,
at 339–43.
35. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institu-
tions for Collective Action 1–7 (1990) (describing the tragedy of the commons, the pris-
oner’s dilemma game, and the logic of collective action); Posner, supra note 34, at 7–13
(discussing the need for traditional regulation to solve collective-action problems).
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III. Extending the Theory: Lessons from the ADA
To demonstrate the usefulness of expressive law analysis and to expand
on McAdams’s theory, especially his articulation of information provision,
we apply expressive theory to the ADA. Doing so reveals two limitations that
should be expanded upon. Section III.A addresses how Expressive Powers
fails to consider the expressive influxes of compliance with law as a category
distinct from enactment and implementation. Section III.B discusses how
Expressive Powers unnecessarily limits the inferences that can be drawn from
enforcement, enactment, and compliance with the law.
The ADA was enacted in 1990 as an “emancipation proclamation”36 on
behalf of some 43 million people with disabilities who historically had been
excluded from equally participating in the social and economic opportuni-
ties of American life.37 Such exclusion extended to employment, state and
local government programs and services, public accommodations, and tele-
communication systems.38 Prominent among the ADA’s five titles are Title I
relating to the workplace (that is, private employment spheres)39 and Title
III concerning places of public accommodation (meaning any areas that
members of the public can enter and use).40 Titles I and III both prohibit
discrimination,41 and each also requires that reasonable adjustments be
made to existing physical and modal conditions42 to guarantee equal social
opportunities for individuals with disabilities.43 Title I refers to occupational
36. Two former senators have been credited with originating this phrase. See 136 Cong.
Rec. S9689 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Senator Harkin); 135 Cong. Rec. S10789
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
37. See David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in
Handbook of Disability Studies 11, 52 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) (exploring peo-
ple with disabilities’ history of “abuse, neglect, sterilization, stigma, euthanasia, segregation,
and institutionalization”); Michael Ashley Stein et al., Disability, in 2 Oxford International
Encyclopedia of Legal History 334, 335–36 (Stanley N. Katz et al. eds., 2009) (explaining
that the twentieth century saw the creation and expansion in the United States of separate
educational, medical, and custodial institutions for people with disabilities).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012).
39. Id. §§ 12111–12117.
40. Id. §§ 12181–12189.
41. Id. §§ 12112, 12182.
42. Id. In other words, the Act provides that people must be able to access places where
goods and services are provided in both a physical manner (such as ramps for wheelchair
users, or large print text for the visually impaired) and a modal manner (for example, sign
language interpretation for the deaf and hard of hearing, or the use of easy language instruc-
tion for those with intellectual disabilities).
43. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 581–82 (2004) (explaining that Congress in-
tended Titles I and III to create equality for people with disabilities).
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emendations as reasonable accommodations,44 and Title III describes altera-
tions to places of public accommodation as reasonable modifications.45 No-
tably, the ADA defines the denial of reasonable accommodation itself as a
form of prohibited discrimination.46 Through each of these mandates, the
ADA requires businesses47 to internalize the respective cost of adjustments
that do not themselves rise to a level of undue hardship.48
A. Considering Compliance Beyond Enactment and Enforcement
Expressive Powers suggests that, in addition to passage of law, enforce-
ment of law can also have expressive effects. In describing the mechanisms
by which enforcement expresses information, McAdams primarily focuses
on the inferences to be drawn from the actions of judges and juries.49 What
is noticeably absent from this account, however, is that private individuals
may signal information on attitudes simply by complying with the law.50 In
this Section we turn to the differential impacts of two titles of the ADA to
demonstrate the expressive influence of compliance.
Despite the overall normative aspirational similarity of Titles I and III,
these measures have engendered dramatically different consequences.51 The
disability unemployment rate—which has been increasing since 1984, six
years prior to the ADA’s enactment52—has continued an upward trajectory
relative to that of the nondisabled population, reaching a historic level of
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
45. Id. § 12184(b)(2)(A).
46. Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12182(a)(2)(A).
47. The ADA applies to state and local governments, both explicitly in Title II, and im-
plicitly as in the case of state and local governments acting in their capacities as employers
(normally covered by Title I). See id. §§ 12111–12112. But see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating certain portions of the ADA as applied to
actions for monetary damages against state and local employers). Because we focus on the
expressive effect of law on private actors in this Review, however, we set to the side that aspect
of the statute.
48. For an exhaustive account of the costs and benefits of reasonable accommodations,
see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 Duke L.J.
79 (2003).
49. McAdams does suggest that executive and administrative actions can also signal in-
formation. Pp. 170–73.
50. McAdams clearly recognizes that private behavior can signal attitudes. But nowhere
does he affirmatively delineate a mechanism describing how compliance can also express
information.
51. See Michael Ashley Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People with Disabilities, 123
Harv. L. Rev. 1658, 1658–61 (2010) (highlighting the failure rate of cases brought under the
ADA’s Title I employment provisions and the comparative success of Title III actions involving
public accommodations); Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1807, 1826–32 (2005).
52. See John J. Donohue III et al., Assessing Post-ADA Employment: Some Econometric
Evidence and Policy Considerations, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 477, 480–82, 488 (2011) (cit-
ing work by labor economist Richard Burkhauser and others).
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nearly 80 percent.53 By contrast, equal access for people with disabilities to
places of public accommodation has dramatically improved since the ADA’s
passage, vastly improving the quality of life for disabled Americans.54
At least three interrelated reasons arising from design or enforcement of
these respective titles help explain their divergent compliance.55 Principally,
and endogenous to the ADA, is the contrasting clarity of the respective titles.
The definition of disability under Title I, meaning the identity of the group
to be protected, has been vague and controversial since its inception.56 This
is because Congress lifted whole-cloth a tripartite definition of disability
from the predecessor Rehabilitation Act (which applied to recipients of fed-
eral funding) without also incorporating into the ADA the laundry list of
individuals covered by the statute.57 As a consequence, judges reinterpreted
the disability category with every case, and did so narrowly, creating an al-
most insurmountable barrier to trial, with some 97 percent of federal Title I
plaintiffs losing.58 Conversely, Title III’s ambit of protection is much clearer
because the attendant Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) details precisely
53. See Kessler Found. & Nat’l Org. on Disability, The ADA, 20 Years Later 10
(2010), http://nod.org/assets/downloads/2010_Survey_of_Americans_with_Disabilities_
GAPS_Full_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/DG69-MQPX]; Kessler Found. & Nat’l Org. on
Disability, Survey of Employment of Americans with Disabilities 6 n.1 (2010) http://
nod.org/assets/downloads/2010_Employment_Survey_Final_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DK8J-ABAD].
54. See Nat’l Council on Disability, Voices of Freedom: America Speaks out on
the ADA (1995), http://www.ncd.gov/policy/voices-freedom-america-speaks-out-americans-
disabilities-act [http://perma.cc/Z3HX-MQ9N]; Michael E. Waterstone et al., Disability Cause
Lawyers, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1287, 1357 (2012).
55. Literally hundreds of law review articles have addressed the efficacy of the ADA in
reference to particular provisions or more generally.
56. Take, for example, the assessment of Justice O’Connor, whose ADA opinions heavily
circumscribed application of the statute (and were later overturned by Congress), that the
scope of ADA coverage contains “uncertainties as to what Congress had in mind” because the
legislative sponsors were “so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn’t been as
carefully written as a group of law professors might put together.” Charles Lane, O’Connor
Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 2002, at A2. But see Chai R.
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 91 (2000) (description
by one of the law professor drafters of the ADA of the legislative history and how the Supreme
Court Justices misunderstood the statute).
57. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme
Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classifi-
cation, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 81, 111–23 (2002).
58. See, e.g., Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Titles I and
V—Survey Update, 35 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 394, 394–95 (2011) (reporting
a 98.2 percent win rate for employers in Titles I and V litigation); Amy L. Allbright, 2009
Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 34 Mental & Physical Disa-
bility L. Rep. 339, 339–40 (2010) (reporting a 97.4 percent win rate for employers in Titles I
and V litigation). These figures are current as of 2010, the last year the ABA Commission
reported data.
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what places of public accommodation must be altered and how.59 For in-
stance, in the context of a medical provider’s examination room, the CFR
mandates exact details as to the height of examination tables, the amount of
floor space (including wheelchair turning space), the width of doors, and
appropriate examination tables, scales, radiographic equipment, lifts and
gurneys, and the extent of staff training.60
Two effects exogenous to the ADA likewise leverage the different relative
levels of compliance between the two titles. The Department of Justice, for a
variety of political reasons, and the private bar, for economic reasons, have
each avoided bringing employment discrimination lawsuits under Title I (af-
ter review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).61 By con-
trast, each of these law-enforcing groups has robustly and successfully
brought Title III cases,62 which also garner legal fees.63 More difficult to mea-
sure, but having significant expressive effect, are the differing histories and
social expectations relating to disability-based employment versus public-
accommodation access. A binary view contrasting disability and employ-
ment reaches back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, with the notion that people
either are disabled or work capable.64 Subsequently, laws, social-welfare ben-
efits—and, most importantly, cultural mores—developed that simply do
not expect people with disabilities to work, let alone be equal participants in
the workplace.65 Consistent with this trend, Title I prohibits discrimination
but has yet to impact broader social understandings regarding the work-
place; it has not made employment for people with disabilities “the new
normal.”66 And, although the ADA is not itself designed to achieve such
59. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.401–.406 (2015).
60. For illustrated guidelines, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Access to Medical Care for Individuals with Mobility Disabilities
(2010), http://www.ada.gov/medcare_mobility_ta/medcare_ta.htm [http://perma.cc/Q9WE-
DHYT].
61. See Stein et al., supra note 51, at 1697–98; Waterstone et al., supra note 54, at
1301–04, 1313, 1324 n.184.
62. Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 54; Waterstone et al., supra note 54, at
1357.
63. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
“Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 10 (2006); Waterstone, supra note 51, at 1868.
64. See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
Calif. L. Rev. 809, 821–23 (1966).
65. For a contemporary overview of laws and policies, see Michael Ashley Stein et al.,
Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689 (2014). For an historical account of the
same, see Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State (1984).
66. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Employment, in Emerging Workforce
Issues: W.I.A., Ticket to Work, and Partnerships 95, 95 (L. Robert McConnell ed., 2001)
(stating that post-ADA studies “find a relative reduction in the employment rate of workers
with disabilities concurrent with either a neutral or a beneficial effect on wages”).
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change,67 it was sold to the American public as being capable of doing so.68
This set of deeply embedded social expectations contrasts sharply with the
historical exclusion of individuals from places of public accommodation on
the ground of race, and the subsequent transformation in American cultural
expectations that every member of the public—regardless of race, sex, or
now, disability—is entitled to go everywhere in public.69 Such a sea change
maps well onto “a new normal”: that people with disabilities are entitled to
equally access and enjoy areas of public accommodation.70 Consequently,
the implementation and enforcement of Titles I and III have been dramati-
cally different.
While there are many ways to explain the relative successes and failures
of Titles I and III, we argue that one major source of their differing effects
on behavior is expressive, and in particular, expression that comes from
compliance with the law. McAdams makes an important contribution to the
literature by considering how enforcement, separate from passage of a law,
can have expressive effects. In his usual manner, McAdams provides a rigor-
ous and detailed structure for considering enforcement’s expressive effects.
He identifies different enforcement mechanisms—criminal (pp. 176–93),
civil (pp. 193–98), and arbitral (pp. 199–232)—and specifically details the
ways in which each of these can signal information. In the case of the ADA,
however, we suggest that expressive effects are best explained not by looking
at the actions of judges, juries, and prosecutors in enforcing the law, but
rather by examining compliance. We further suggest that there is a slightly
different inferential mechanism attendant to compliance with a law that will
also provide information on, among other things, attitudes regarding the
matter being regulated.
We note at the outset that we agree with McAdams, who describes the
strong relationship between expression and deterrence effects of enforce-
ment. Enforcement of the law clearly can “send a message” to the public
about the possibility that violating a legal standard will result in punishment
or payment to the injured party. In this sense, when enforcement acts ex-
pressively it is providing information relevant to deterrence. By raising per-
ceptions of the probability of having to pay, such a message increases the
exogenous costs of failure to comply with the law. As McAdams notes, how-
ever, there are times when enforcement of law can send a different message
as well (pp. 175, 178–79). We do not dispute that the ADA influenced be-
havior through its deterrent effects. Rather, we argue that in considering the
ADA’s expressive effects, enforcement and compliance should be treated as
67. See id. (“The efficacy of any law is dependent upon considerations beyond the mere
fact of its existence. This is especially true for civil rights statutes, which seek not only to
equalize opportunities for their targeted groups, but also to transform society’s attitudes to-
wards those individuals.”).
68. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 921, 955 (2003).
69. See Bradley Allan Areheart & Michael Ashley Stein, Integrating the Internet, 83 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 449, 476–89 (2015).
70. See id.
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discrete inferential mechanisms. From differences in compliance with the
ADA in part, the right of public accommodation is much more accepted in
today’s world than it was twenty-five years ago, while attitudes toward em-
ploying disabled persons have not substantially changed.
To begin, we turn to the theory of enforcement in Expressive Powers.
McAdams identifies a number of conditions that must be met for enforce-
ment to potentially have expressive effect: (1) the enforcement action must
carry some clear audience meaning; (2) enforcement must be publicized;
and (3) there must be a logical basis for inferring that a judge or jury is
providing information on the attitudes of others (pp. 179–87). Of these con-
ditions, McAdams suggests that the first condition is the most often ignored
(p. 180). It is important, he notes, to explain specifically what the populace
and not the speaker will infer from enforcement.71 In other words, what a
judge thinks the law expresses is irrelevant to the inquiry. Rather, as Expres-
sive Powers puts it, “[w]hen evaluating causal claims about ‘sending a mes-
sage,’ we are really looking for the message received” (p. 179).
Applying McAdams’s enforcement criteria to the ADA suggests that en-
forcement may have had some impact on perception regarding, and subse-
quent acceptance of, equal access to places of public accommodation for
people with disabilities. Consider, for example, the visibility of court rulings,
as well as settlements, on accessibility impacting venues such as the Empire
State Building, Exxon gas stations, Macy’s department stores, AMC movie
theatres, and Safeway supermarkets.72 Separate from enforcement, compli-
ance with the law has also influenced society’s attitudes toward places of
public accommodation. Compliance with Title III of the ADA has resulted
in private businesses installing a large number of publicly visible accommo-
dations. These changes can certainly provide information to society even
though they are done voluntarily without requiring enforcement. Using Mc-
Adams’s conditions on expressive enforcement as a starting point, we sug-
gest a set of standards to use in determining when compliance with the law
will have expressive influence: (1) compliance carries clear audience mean-
ing; (2) compliance is visible to the public; and (3) there must be a basis for
inferring from the compliance attitudes of others. In comparing enforce-
ment and compliance, we suggest that the visibility of compliance was the
most significant factor in expressing attitudes toward places of public
accommodation.
Beyond being much more publicly visible, an additional factor support-
ing the expressive effect of compliance is that the actors are the regulated
71. See pp. 179–83.
72. The panoply of cases brought, won, and/or settled by the Department of Justice is
available at ADA Enforcement, ADA.gov, http://www.ada.gov/enforce_current.htm [http://
perma.cc/3J8Y-DSKM]. For discussion of well-publicized private enforcement, see Stein et al.,
supra note 51, at 1669–77, 1692–702; Waterstone et al., supra note 54, 1348–51; Waterstone,
supra note 51, at 1838–46.
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community, creating a more solid basis for inferring attitudes than infer-
ences drawn from the actions of judges and juries. The installation of park-
ing spaces, curb cuts, ramps, accessible restrooms, service bells, low-level
counters, Braille signage, elevators, and the like sends a message not of what
a judge thinks, but of what those individuals subject to the law think—the
attitudes of some members of the public in general. Parenthetically, to the
extent the entity complying is a government entity, individuals could infer
similar information about attitudes from compliance as from passage of
legislation.
Finally, one probable inference from observation of ubiquitous access to
places of public accommodation is that they are approved of by the public in
general. To support this claim we suggest that individuals observing public
accommodations may employ the following syllogism: (1) accommodations
have been placed everywhere by a variety of people and groups; and (2)
therefore, a large number of people believe disabled individuals should have
equal access to public spaces. Of course, other inferences are also possible.
One could, for example, infer that a business owner has complied with the
ADA to bring more customers into her store or simply to follow the law or
avoid legal sanction. While it may be argued that individuals infer these
additional meanings from compliance, such inferences are not mutually ex-
clusive. Put another way, one might infer a number of different things from
compliance, one of which is that the person or entity complying believes
disabled persons should be given equal access to places of public
accommodation.
B. Extending the Inferential Mechanism
As noted earlier, it is unclear why Expressive Powers focuses on certain
limited types of information that law provides rather than turning to a gen-
eral model that can be used to consider the many different types of informa-
tion that laws convey. Throughout the book, McAdams primarily uses an
inferential reasoning model to describe how law provides information. But,
in describing information provision, he narrowly chooses to consider the
way that law provides information on three categories—attitude, risk, and
compliance (pp. 137–38). Limiting relevant inferences to this troika serves
McAdams’s important goal of providing a rigorous structure in which to
ground further exploration of expressive forces. At the same time, however,
we suggest such a limitation is too stringent. We argue instead that if applied
rigorously to the passage of a law, the simple mechanism of inference with-
out restrictions can be more comprehensive, while also adequately con-
straining an analysis of expressive effects. We attempt to provide just such a
rigorous application to describe how the ADA may provide information on
the employability of disabled workers.
Inferential reasoning is the process of deriving logical conclusions from
premises that are, or are believed to be, true. Analysis of expressive effects
thus requires identification of premises and consideration of whether con-
clusions follow logically from those premises. Our application begins with
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the following syllogism: (1) I believe disabled workers are relatively unpro-
ductive and costly, which is why traditionally they have been cared for by the
state; (2) a law is passed for the purpose of increasing hiring and retention of
disabled workers that imposes costs in the form of workplace accommoda-
tions; and therefore (3) the fact that disabled workers need such a law con-
firms my belief that they are relatively more costly than individuals who are
not disabled.
Let us look at the first premise of the syllogism—the belief that disabled
workers are costly and unproductive. There is a well-established literature
explaining the stereotyped basis for this belief,73 which nevertheless prevails
across all sectors of society including employers, judges, and even otherwise
progressive academics.74 Moreover, the misconception that disabled workers
and their related accommodations (when required) are costly persists in
spite of all available quantitative studies concluding that the vast majority of
accommodations carry either no cost or are more than paid for by related
benefits (including tax credits).75 The second premise—that a law was
passed for the purpose of increasing employment among disabled workers—
is easily verified objectively.76 The conclusion that disabled workers need af-
firmative assistance in accessing and maintaining employment follows logi-
cally from these premises. That is, a person who thinks that disabled workers
require a law to get hired and retained can logically conclude that such
workers are not economically competitive with nondisabled members of the
workforce because they need additional help. The use of such basic inferen-
tial reasoning will allow for consideration of more of the informational con-
sequences of law than the three mechanisms described in Expressive Powers.
Certainly, we should aim for a model that can provide regulators with as
much information on the potential expressive effects of law as possible. We
understand that opening the door to inferential reasoning about more than
just attitudes, risk, and compliance creates more complexity in expressive
analysis. Constrained and clear application of logic, however, allows for a
relatively rigorous analysis of how these inferences occur while polling tech-
niques could easily bear out what people actually believe.
In sum, McAdams constrains his inferential analysis to three specific
categories upon which passage of a law may provide information, and such
artificial limitation is unnecessarily restrictive. Instead, the process of infer-
ential reasoning provides a rigorous framework for judging how passage of a
law may influence beliefs beyond those about attitudes of others, risk of any
73. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 43, at 592–622, 629–36.
74. See id. at 604–08, 616–20, 629–36. Among nonprogressive academics, Richard Ep-
stein’s analysis in advance of the ADA’s regulations coming fully into effect is especially re-
vealing. See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Laws 480–94 (1992) (arguing against the ADA joining the family of antidis-
crimination laws, all of which he opposes, on the ground that it is especially inefficient in that
the accommodation mandate creates a disincentive for employers to hire disabled workers).
75. See Stein, supra note 48, at 102–09; 124–27 (collecting empirical data and demon-
strating the underlying market failure).
76. See, e.g., supra notes 38–39, 56–58, 68 and accompanying text.
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particular activity, and/or the number of people who violate the law. In the
case of the ADA, such a framework allows for rigorous and grounded ex-
pressive analysis without unduly limiting the expressive inquiry.
Conclusion
Expressive Powers is an ambitious contribution to the literature and the-
ory of the influence of law’s expressive effects on behavior. McAdams suc-
ceeds in his stated goals of delineating a rigorous rational choice-based
model of expressive effects while also demonstrating the expressive effect of
law on behavior. In achieving these twin goals, Expressive Powers challenges
current understandings of why individuals obey the law, and is certain to
become an essential reference point for scholars engaging in expressive law
research. We assert that concerns about the unpredictive nature of complex
behavioral theories, which hampers acceptance of models such as expressive
analysis, are misplaced. McAdams succeeds in demonstrating the ubiquity of
effects other than legitimacy and deterrence on behavior. This undermines
claims that more parsimonious theories will be better at predicting the ef-
fects of law. In addition, the book’s rigorous structure may be unnecessarily
Spartan. While we appreciate the importance of rigor to predictability, we
also recognize that a more comprehensive theory better satisfies McAdam’s
desire to describe the many ways in which law works expressively. To expand
its scope without harming its rigor, we applied McAdams’s theory of infor-
mation provision to the ADA, a statute not addressed in Expressive Powers,
and suggested ways in which the book’s structure can be extended without
sacrificing its rigor.
